OFFICE OF THE CHIEF LABOUR COMMISSIONER(CENTRAL), NEW DELHI SECTION-LS SECTION COMPENDIUM OF RELEVANT COURT CASES FOR REFERENCE OF OUR OFFICERS Sl.No. Act In the matter of Subject 1. The Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 In the matter of nominee/ legal heir/ successor S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 1973/2024 filed by Hemlata…
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF LABOUR COMMISSIONER(CENTRAL), NEW DELHI
SECTION-LS SECTION
COMPENDIUM OF RELEVANT COURT CASES FOR REFERENCE OF OUR OFFICERS
| Sl.No. | Act | In the matter of | Subject |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | The Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 | In the matter of nominee/ legal heir/ successor | S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 1973/2024 filed by Hemlata Sharma vs Vandana Tripathi and 7 others in the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur. |
| 2. | The Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 | In the matter of forfeiture of gratuity on the grounds of moral turpitude. | Civil Appeal No. 2608 of 2025 filed by Western Coal Fields Ltd. Vs Manohar Govinda Fulzele & Anr. in the Supreme Court of India. |
[2025:RJ-JP:18282]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 1973/2024
Hemlata Sharma Wife Of Satish Chand Sharma, Aged About 63 Years, Resident Of House No. 446, Ekta Nagar-A, Heerapura, Ajmer Road, Jaipur (Raj.).
----Appellant
Versus
----Respondents
For Appellant(s) : Ms. Sampti Sharma For Respondent(s) : Mr. Ajay Kumar Tanenia- No.4 Mr. Gauri Jasana for Mr. Prateek Kasliwal-No.5
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE GANESH RAM MEENA
Judgment
Date of Reserve ::: April 28, 2025 Date of Pronouncement ::: May 16, 2025
[2025:RJ-JP:18282] (2 of 20) [CMA-1973/2024]
REPORTABLE
The challenge has been made to the order dated 15.04.2024 to the extent of dismissal of the claim of the appellant of 1/3rd share as regards the amount of the Insurance Policies in the name of the deceased Anand Dadhich, who is the son of the appellant and allowing the succession of respondents No.1 and 2 over the said Policies.
[2025:RJ-JP:18282] (3 of 20) [CMA-1973/2024]
named Charchit Dadhich (respondent No.2) from their wedlock. It was further stated that Anand Dadhich expired on 25.06.2021 and after his death his first category successors are the appellant as well as respondents No.1 and 2. It was further stated that the deceased son of the appellant Anand Dadhich was having certain Insurance Policies and Savings Bank Account in the State Bank of India, Chitrakut Branch, Jaipur and also having FDRs of the Bank of Baroda. Deceased Anand Dadhich had not executed any will in favour of any person and therefore, the appellant as well as respondents No.1 and 2 being the first category successors, sould get to hold 1/3rd share each in succession out of the Insurance Policies, Savings and the FDRs.
[2025:RJ-JP:18282] (4 of 20) [CMA-1973/2024]
It was further stated that when the appellant as well as respondents No.1 and 2 moved separate applications for claiming the amount in the Savings Account, FDR as well as the maturity claim of the Policies in the name of Anand Dadhich, the concerned authorities asked the appellant as well as respondents No.1 and 2 to get the succession certificate from the Competent Court.
The learned court below framed three issues. After recording the evidence of the parties, the court below disposed of the application for succession certificate vide order dated 15.04.2024 holding that the appellant is entitled to get 1/3rd share of the amount in the Savings Account of deceased- Anand Dadhich and so also in the amount of the FDR, however, dismissed the succession certificate as regards the maturity claim of the Insurance Policies in the name of the deceased son- Anand Dadhich.
Counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant being the first category successor along-with respondents No.1 and 2, is also entitled to get 1/3rd share in the maturity claim of the Policies in the name of deceased son- Anand Dadhich. He further submits that merely because respondent No.1 has been the nominee, the claim of the appellant cannot be discarded. Counsel for the appellant also
[2025:RJ-JP:18282] (5 of 20) [CMA-1973/2024]
submits that the nominee is appointed to collect the benefits but the actual beneficiaries would be all the successors.
No-one has put in appearance on behalf of respondents No.1 and 2 and appearance has only been given by the counsels appearing for respondents No. 4 and 5.
Counsel appearing for respondent No.5- Max Life Insurance Pvt. Ltd. submits that they have already disbursed the maturity claim of the Insurance Policy issued by them on the basis of the succession certificate dated 15.04.2024.
Counsel appearing for respondent No.4- Life Insurance Corporation submits that they have not yet disbursed the maturity claim of the Polices in the name of deceased- Anand Dadhich.
The only issue which requires consideration by this Court is ‘Whether the Nominee, as mentioned in the Insurance Policy, is alone entitled to seek the benefits arising out of the Insurance Policy or the Successors of the person in whose name the Insurance Policy was issued, will get the fruits in equal share?’ The appellant is the mother of deceased- Anand Dadhich in whose name the Insurance Policies were issued and respondent No.1- wife of Anand Dadhich was nominated as a Nominee.
[2025:RJ-JP:18282] (6 of 20) [CMA-1973/2024]
In every human life, the mother holds a position of unparalleled importance. She is not merely the biological starting point of an individual but is also the emotional, psychological, and often moral foundation of a person's existence. To put it appositely, I would like to use the phrase "mother is the ultimate reason of a person’s being" because it captures a truth that transcends culture, religion, geography, and time. It speaks to the role of the mother not only in giving birth but also in nurturing, guiding, and shaping an individual’s identity, values, and life trajectory.
From the moment of conception, a mother becomes the vessel of life. Her body, emotions, and even thoughts are oriented toward the well-being of the child she carries. This biological link, deeply intimate and physically demanding, is only the beginning. A mother does not stop being a mother at birth. In fact, it is often said that a woman truly becomes a mother in the countless decisions, sacrifices, and acts of love that follow.
This initial dependence is not just a biological fact but a symbolic one. It signifies that every human being begins their journey with a connection rooted in care,
[2025:RJ-JP:18282] (7 of 20) [CMA-1973/2024]
sacrifice, and unspoken trust. The womb is the first home, and the mother is the first universe a person ever knows. In many ways, a mother is the first teacher a child has. When a mother instills compassion, honesty, and resilience, she is not just parenting—she is building the foundations of a person’s moral compass.
The sacrifices made by mothers often go unrecognized. These are not acts of weakness but of extraordinary strength. This selflessness shapes the very fabric of the family and, by extension, society.
Across cultures and religions, motherhood is revered and sanctified. In Hinduism, the concept of "Matru Devo Bhava" (Mother is God) elevates the mother to divine status. In Christianity, Mary, the mother of Jesus, is venerated for her purity and devotion. In Islam, the Prophet Muhammad famously said, “Paradise lies under the feet of the mother,” signifying her exalted place in life and afterlife. These cultural acknowledgments are not mere ceremonial expressions. They reflect a universal recognition of the mother as the axis around which life spins. She is the nurturer, the caregiver, the protector, and the spiritual anchor.
For many, the loss of a mother is described as losing a part of themselves. That absence can create a void that is difficult to fill because it is not just the loss of a person—it is the loss of the very foundation on which life was built.
[2025:RJ-JP:18282] (8 of 20) [CMA-1973/2024]
Conversely, when a mother’s legacy is strong, her influence lives on long after she is gone, passed on to the next generation.
Given this immense role, it is deeply painful and unjust when mothers are neglected, particularly in their later years. As children grow and take on their own responsibilities, many drift away, unintentionally or otherwise. Despite the undeniable contributions mothers make to their children’s lives, it is a sad reality that many are neglected, especially as they grow older. Societies often fail to recognize the depth of a mother’s sacrifices, and individuals, caught in the rush of their own lives, sometimes forget to honor and care for the very person who gave them life.
Neglecting a mother is akin to turning one’s back on the very origin of life. It is a denial of the sacrifices she made, the nights she stayed awake, the pain she endured, and the love she gave unconditionally.
No success, no achievement, and no material wealth can ever repay the debt we owe our mothers. She is the reason for our being—not just biologically, but emotionally and morally. Her hands held us when we were most vulnerable, and her heart loved us without condition. Neglecting such a person is not only an injustice to her, but also a betrayal of our own humanity. We must remember that
[2025:RJ-JP:18282] (9 of 20) [CMA-1973/2024]
as we grow stronger, she may grow weaker—and in those moments, our love and support are the least we can offer.
In a world where distractions are many and gratitude is often forgotten, taking the time to honour our mothers reminds us of what truly matters. She may not ask for thanks, but she deserves it more than anyone else. For in her, we find the roots of our identity, the source of our compassion, and the first and most enduring definition of home.
Nomination is a legal arrangement that designates an individual to manage and hold the property in trust for the legal heirs upon the owner’s demise. The property ownership is not transferred to the nominee; he or she is just the trustee of the property until the legal heirs are identified and established according to the Succession Act or a will. Once
[2025:RJ-JP:18282] (10 of 20) [CMA-1973/2024]
the legal heirs are determined, the nominee is legally bound to transfer the property to them. The nominee acts as a custodian or trustee of the asset, not the ultimate owner. Thus, nomination is an administrative mechanism rather than a testamentary disposition. Assigning a nominee facilitates a smooth transition of property ownership when the property owner passes away, ensuring the property is protected until the rightful inheritors can take possession.
Succession in India is governed by a variety of laws depending on the religion of the deceased. Under these laws, the property of a deceased person devolves upon the legal heirs in a prescribed manner. For example, under the Hindu Succession Act, Class I heirs like the spouse, children, and mother inherit equally.
“39. Nomination by policy-holder.-- (1) The holder of a policy of life insuranceon hi s own life may, when effecting the policy or at any time before the policy matures for payment, nominate the person or persons to whom the money secured by the policy shall be paid in the event of hi s death: Provided that, where any nominee is a minor, it shall be lawful for the policy holder to appoint in the prescribed manner any person to receive the money secured by the policy
[2025:RJ-JP:18282] (11 of 20) [CMA-1973/2024]
in the event of his death during the minority of the nominee. (2) Any such nomination in order to be effectual shall, unless it is incorporated in the text of the policy itself, be made by an endorsement on the policy communicated to the insurer and registered by hi m in the records relating to the policy and any such nomination may at any time before the policy matures for payment be cancelled or changed by an endorsement or a further endorsement or a will, as the case may be, but unless notice in writing of any such cancellation or change has been delivered to the insurer, the insurer shall not be liable for any payment under the policy made bona fide by hi m to a nominee mentioned in the text of the policy or registered in records of the insurer. (3) The insurer shall furnish to the policy-holder a written acknowledgement of having registered a nomination or a cancellation or change thereof, and may charge a fee not exceeding one rupee for registering such cancellation or change. (4) A transfer or assignment of a policy made in accordance with section 38 shall automatically cancel a nomination: Provided that the assignment, of a policy to the insurer who bears the risk on the policy at the time of the assignment, in consideration of a loan granted by that insurer on the security of the policy within its surrender value, or its reassignment on repayment of the loan shall not cancel a nomination, but shall affect the rights of the
[2025:RJ-JP:18282] (12 of 20) [CMA-1973/2024]
nominee only to the extent of the insurer's interest in the policy. (5) Where the policy matures for payment during thelifetime of the person whose life is insured or where the nominee or, if there are more nominees than one, all the nominees die before the policy matures for payment, the amount secured by the policy shall be payable to the policy-holder or his heirs or legal representatives or the holder of a succession certificate, as the case may be. (6) Where the nominee or, if there are more nominees than one, a nominee or nominees survive the person whose life is insured, the amount secured by the policy shall be payable to such survivor or survivors. (7) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any policy of life insurance to which section 6 of the Married Women's Property Act, 1874 (3 of 1874 applies or has at any time applied: Provided that where a nomination made whether before or after the commencement of the Insurance (Amendment) Act, 1946, in favour of the wife of the person who has insured hi s life or of hi s wife and children or any of them is expressed, whether or not on the face of the policy, as being made under this section, the said section 6 shall be deemed not to apply or not to have applied to the policy.”
[2025:RJ-JP:18282] (13 of 20) [CMA-1973/2024]
A. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarbati Devi Vs. Usha Devi reported as [1984] 1 S.C.R. 992 has dealt with a similar situation, wherein, in his life insurance policy, the deceased had nominated only his wife. He died intestate leaving behind his wife, mother and a son. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that a mere nomination made under Section 39 of the Insurance Act, 1938 does not have the effect of conferring on the nominee any beneficial interest in the amount payable under the life insurance policy on the death of the deceased. The nomination only indicates the hand which is authorized to receive the amount, on the payment of which the insurer gets a valid discharge of its liability under the policy. The amount, however, can be claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with the law of succession governing them. On the death of the policyholder the amount payable under the policy becomes part of his estate which is governed by the law of succession applicable to him. Such succession may be testamentary or intestate. Section 39 of the Act was not intended to act as a third mode of succession provided by the Statute. The language of Section 39 of the Act is neither capable of altering the course of succession under law nor can be said to have equated a nominee to an heir or legatee.
B. The Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of Smt. Yashodha v. Smt. Rashmi decided on 27.11.2023 after
[2025:RJ-JP:18282] (14 of 20) [CMA-1973/2024]
taking into consideration the various Supreme Court judgment on this points of law has held as under:-
“11.7 As stated supra, despite the existence of a non obstante clause and usage of specific words in other enactments referred to supra, the Apex Court has categorically held that the basic principle underlying the right of a nominee is not dependent on the language employed in the provisions but is based on the premise that the insurance policy amounts become part of the estate of the deceased and the nominee would not be entitled to claim exclusive right over the same, which would necessarily have to be distributed among all his legal heirs. Under these circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that the trial court was fully justified in passing the impugned order allowing I.A.No.6 and consequently, decreeing the suit in favour of the plaintiffs.”
To this extent, this Court is in agreement with the dictum of the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court.
C. In the case of Shakti Yezdani & Anr. Vs. Jayanand Jayant Salgaonkar & Ors. reported as [2023] 16 S.C.R. 695, the nominees claimed absolute right to the shares/securities of the deceased, to the exclusion of all other successors / legal heirs, on the ground that under Section 109A and 109B of the Companies Act, 1956 (pari materia Section 72 of the 2013 Act), they being nominees stood exclusively vested with the ownership thereof. The Hon’ble
[2025:RJ-JP:18282] (15 of 20) [CMA-1973/2024]
Supreme Court held otherwise and opined that the nomination does not override the succession laws, and there is no third mode of succession that the scheme of the Companies Act, 1956 aims or intends to provide. Reiterating the various earlier judgements, on the subject of the succession laws overriding the nomination in the various Acts, which are also cited in this Article, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that nomination does not lead to the nominee attaining absolute title over the subject property for which such nomination was made. Legal heirs therefore have not been excluded by virtue of nomination. The legislative intent of creating a scheme of nomination under the Companies Act, 1956 is not intended to grant absolute rights of ownership in favour of the nominee merely because the provision contains three elements i.e. the term “vest”, a non-obtante clause, and the phrase “to the exclusion of others”. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are quoted as under:
“26. A consistent view appears to have been taken by the courts, whileinterpreting the related provisions of nomination under different statutes. It is clear from the referred judgments that the nomination so made would not lead to the nominee attaining absolute title over the subject property for which such nomination was made. In other words, the usual mode of succession is not to be impacted by such nomination. The legal
[2025:RJ-JP:18282] (16 of 20) [CMA-1973/2024]
heirs therefore have not been excluded by virtue of nomination. 46. Additionally, there is a complex layer of commercial considerations that are to be taken into account while dealing with the issue of nomination pertaining to companies or until legal heirs are able to sufficiently establish their right of succession to the company. Therefore, offering a discharge to the entity once the nominee is in picture is quite distinct from granting ownership of securities to nominees instead of the legal heirs. Nomination process therefore does not override the succession laws. Simply said, there is no third mode of succession that the scheme of the Companies Act, 1956 (pari materia provisions in Companies Act, 2013) and Depositories Act, 1996 aims or intends to provide.”
D. Further the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indrani Wahi v. Registrar of Co-operative Societies [2016] 4 S.C.R. 307, clarified that a nominee is entitled to receive securities but does not become the owner if there are other claimants under succession law. The idea behind this observation was that such a transfer in favour of the nominee would have no relevance to the issue of title between the inheritors or successors to the property of the deceased and it would be open to the other members of the family to pursue their case of succession or inheritance, in consonance with law.
[2025:RJ-JP:18282] (17 of 20) [CMA-1973/2024]
Thus, time and again the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the trite law by holding that it is difficult to treat a nominee as being equivalent to an heir or legatee. Any amount paid to the nominee is essentially the estate of the deceased which is to devolve upon all persons who are entitled to succession under law, custom or testament of the deceased holder. The nominee is liable to return the amount to those in whose favour law creates beneficial interest. Succession laws supersede nomination in the Indian context.
In India, the issue of succession and nomination often creates confusion regarding the rightful ownership of a deceased person's assets. A common misconception is that a nominee automatically becomes the owner of the asset after the death of the account holder or policyholder. However, Indian succession laws make it clear that nomination does not override the legal rights of heirs. Succession laws—whether governed by personal laws (like the Hindu Succession Act, 1956) or the Indian Succession Act, 1925—take precedence over any nomination made in financial instruments or property holdings. Therefore, while nomination facilitates faster disbursal of assets, it does not confer ownership rights unless the nominee is also a legal heir. The act of nomination facilitates efficient administration and ensures that funds are not held up due to procedural delays after death. However, it does not override the
[2025:RJ-JP:18282] (18 of 20) [CMA-1973/2024]
substantive rights of legal heirs under the applicable law of succession. The nominee acts merely as a conduit or trustee, and the ultimate ownership is governed by succession law, not by nomination. Thus, while nomination provides a valid discharge to the payer, it does not transfer ownership to the nominee unless supported by a will or succession laws. Individuals should be mindful of this legal distinction to avoid confusion and potential disputes among heirs.
So, if a man dies without a will and he is survived by his wife and mother, both are entitled to an equal share in his assets under intestate succession, regardless of who the nominee is in a particular financial instrument. This includes bank accounts, insurance policies, provident funds, and other investments. If the deceased son names his wife as the nominee, she receives the insurance proceeds. However, she
[2025:RJ-JP:18282] (19 of 20) [CMA-1973/2024]
does so as a trustee for all legal heirs, which means she must distribute the money according to the legal entitlements of the heirs unless there is a will stating otherwise. In summary, while a wife may be the nominee in a policy or account, she is not the sole beneficiary unless named as such in a will. A mother, as a Class I legal heir under the Hindu Succession Act, has an equal right to her deceased son’s assets in the absence of a will.
in light of the present set of facts as well, nomination ensures smooth transfer of assets but does not establish ownership. Legal heirs, including the mother, can rightfully claim her share, and any denial of such rights can be challenged in court and the present appeal filed by the appellant (mother) deserves to be allowed.
In view of the discussion made above, the present misc. appeal filed by the appellant is allowed. The impugned order dated 15.04.2024 passed by the Court of learned District Judge, Jaipur Metropolitan-II, Civil Misc. (Succession) Application No. 1310/2021 (1315/2021) titled as Hemlata Sharma v. Vandana Tripathi & Ors., is quashed and set aside. The application filed by the appellant for succession certificate is allowed as prayed for. The appellant apart from 1/3rd share in Bank Deposits is held entitled to receive 1/3rd of the amount of Insurance Policies numbered as Police No. 199507712, Policy No. 199050537, Policy No. 371687153
[2025:RJ-JP:18282] (20 of 20) [CMA-1973/2024]
and Policy No. 005993023 as well as the deposits in the name of her son Anand Dadhich issued by the respondent-Insurance Company.
The respondents No.4 & 5 namely; Life Insurance Corporation and Max Life Insurance Pvt. Ltd. shall disburse 1/3rd share of the maturity claim of the above numbered insurance polices to the appellant (mother). In case the Insurance Companies have already disbursed the amount to the respondents No.1 and 2 then the respondents No.1 and 2 shall pay 1/3rd share of the maturity claim of the Policies to the appellant within a period of two months from the date of receipt of the notice to be issued by the appellant after receiving the certified copy of this Judgment. In case the respondents No.1 and 2 do not make the payment of 1/3rd share of the maturity claim to the appellant then they shall be liable to pay interest @ 9% per annum with effect from the date they received the maturity claim from the Insurance Companies till the payment is made to the appellant.
In view of the judgment passed in the main case, the stay application and pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.
(GANESH RAM MEENA),J
Sharma NK/Dy. Registrar
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2608 of 2025 (@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO.10088 of 2020)
Western Coal Fields Ltd. …Appellant
versus
Manohar Govinda Fulzele & Anr. …Respondent(s)
W I T H
Civil Appeal No.2609 of 2025 (@ Special Leave Petition (C) No.21957 of 2022)
Civil Appeal No.2610 of 2025 (@ Special Leave Petition (C) No.1907 of 2025)
J U D G M E N T
K. VINOD CHANDRAN, J.
Leave granted.
The question raised in the above cases is the permissibility of forfeiture of gratuity, in the event of termination of service on misconduct, which can be categorised as an act constituting an offence involving moral turpitude; without there being any conviction in a criminal case or even a criminal proceeding having been initiated.
The appellant in one of the appeals is a Public Sector Undertaking¹ on whose behalf learned Solicitor General Mr. Tushar Mehta appears. The other appeals are by the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation² for whom Ms. Mayuri Raghuvanshi, learned Standing Counsel appears. Impugned judgments found the forfeiture of gratuity to be not permissible under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (the Act) relying on the decision of this
¹ For brevity ‘PSU’ ² For brevity ‘MSRTC’
Court in Union Bank of India and Ors. vs. C.G. Ajay Babu³. On behalf of the contesting respondent in the appeal filed by the PSU, Mr. Shivaji M. Jadhav appears to defend the reasoning in the judgment and none appears for the respondent in the appeals filed by the MSRTC; though served with notice.
³ (2018) 9 SCC 529
dismissal before the High Court failed, but the forfeiture was held to be bad. The forfeiture was upset, on the finding that, there was no allegation of financial loss caused to the bank; which was the only ground on which gratuity could be forfeited as per the Bipartite Settlement regulating the conduct and behaviour of the employees of the Bank; including disbursal of gratuity.
the Bipartite Settlement, which also contains provisions for payment of gratuity and its forfeiture, sub-section (6) of Section 4 of the Act is inapplicable to the employees of the bank. The Settlement providing for better terms of gratuity also provided for its forfeiture when the misconduct results in financial losses to the bank and only to the extent of the loss; while specifically prohibiting forfeiture of gratuity for dismissal on any other ground. The order of the High Court was upheld finding that the forfeiture; in the teeth of the provisions of the Bipartite Settlement, could not have been carried out by the bank.
Court in Jaswant Singh Gill vs. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd.⁴.
⁴ (2007) 1 SCC 663 ⁵ For brevity ‘CDA Rules’
proceedings are pending, and the provision to recover from the gratuity, the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the company were contrary to the provisions under Section 4 of the Gratuity Act, which provisions of the Act prevail over the CDA Rules. It was held that though the CDA Rules provided for disciplinary proceeding to be continued after superannuation, the major penalty of dismissal could not have been imposed after superannuation. Looking at sub-section (6) of Section 4; which takes away the accrued, vested right under sub-section (1), its application was held to be possible only when the conditions incorporated therein are fulfilled. A scrupulous observation of the provisions of sub-section (6) would indicate that such forfeiture could be effected only in the event of termination for reason of wilful omission or negligence causing loss to the employer (clause (a)); or if the termination is on account of riotous or disorderly or any other act of violence (clause b(i)); or if the employee has been terminated for any act which constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude (clause b(ii), none of which were
satisfied in that case. Jaswant Singh Gill⁴, according to us, did not find that forfeiture of gratuity under Section 4(6)(b)(ii) is only possible if there is a conviction by a criminal court for an offence, which alone could result in the misconduct being treated as one constituting moral turpitude.
⁶ (2020) 18 SCC 71
turpitude; even when there is no conviction entered by a Criminal Court on the very same offence.
With all the respect at our command, the interpretation in C.G. Ajay Babu³ does not come out of the statutory provision; Section 4(6)(b)(ii) of the Act. Normally we would have referred the matter for consideration by a Larger Bench, but, as we noticed, the statutory provision does not make it a requirement that the misconduct alleged & proved in a departmental enquiry should not only constitute an offence involving moral turpitude, but also should be duly established in a Court of Law. The words "duly established in a Court of Law" cannot be supplied to the provision. Moreover, as we observed; the interpretation of sub-clause (b)(ii) of sub-section (6) of Section 4 was uncalled for in C.G. Ajay Babu³ since the provisions of the Section 4, including sub-section (6) was found to be inapplicable to the employer Bank and its employee, by virtue of sub-section (5) of Section 4. The interpretation, hence, with due respect was an obiter making a reference unnecessary.
As has been argued by the learned Solicitor General and the learned Counsel appearing for MSRTC, sub-clause (ii) of Section 4(6)(b) enables forfeiture of gratuity, wholly or partially, if the delinquent employee is terminated for any act which constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude, if the offence is committed in the course of his employment. An ‘Offence’ as defined in the General Clauses Act, means ‘any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being’ and does not call for a conviction; which definitely can only be on the basis of evidence led in a criminal proceeding. The standard of proof required in a criminal proceeding is quite different from that required in a disciplinary proceeding; the former being regulated by a higher standard of ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’ while the latter governed by ‘preponderance of probabilities’. The provision of forfeiture of gratuity under the Act does not speak of a conviction in a criminal proceeding, for an offence involving moral turpitude. On the contrary, the Act provides for such forfeiture; in cases where the delinquent employee is terminated for a misconduct,
which constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude. Hence, the only requirement is for the Disciplinary Authority or the Appointing Authority to decide as to whether the misconduct could, in normal circumstances, constitute an offence involving moral turpitude, with a further discretion conferred on the authority forfeiting gratuity, to decide whether the forfeiture should be of the whole or only a part of the gratuity payable, which would depend on the gravity of the misconduct. Necessarily, there should be a notice issued to the terminated employee, who should be allowed to represent both on the question of the nature of the misconduct; whether it constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude, and the extent to which such forfeiture can be made. There is a notice issued and consideration made in the instant appeals; the efficacy of which, has to be considered by us separately .
⁷ (2013) 9 SCC 363
Devendra Kumar⁷ was a case where the services of the delinquent employee were terminated for reason of suppressing material information regarding pending criminal cases against him, at the time of appointment. This Court held that when an appointment is obtained by employing fraud; the question is not whether the applicant is suitable for the post but whether the appointment was obtained by supressing material information. It was held that even if the offence alleged in the case pending against the applicant would not involve moral turpitude, suppressing such information would amount to moral turpitude.
In the present case it has been proved that the petitioner supressed his actual date of birth. The failure of the employer to initiate a criminal proceeding on the fraud employed by way of the the fabricated/forged certificate produced for the purpose of employment, does not militate against the forfeiture. Obviously, as coming out from the provision, no conviction in a criminal proceeding is necessitated, if the misconduct alleged & proved constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude. The very same reasoning applies in the appeals by the MSRTC were the delinquent employees, conductors in the stage carriages operated by the MSRTC were found to have indulged in misappropriation of fares collected from passengers. Misappropriation definitely is an act constituting an offence involving moral turpitude.
Now we come to the question of whether the forfeiture of gratuity of the terminated employees should be only partly or wholly. Insofar as the PSU is concerned, the appointment itself was invalid for reason of suppression of the actual date of birth and production of a forged certificate. We extract paragraph 25 from Devendra Kumar⁷ Judgment:
“25. More so, if the initial action is not in consonance with law, the subsequent conduct of a party cannot sanctify the same. Sublato fundamento cadit opus — a foundation being removed, the superstructure falls. A person having done wrong cannot take advantage of his own wrong and plead bar of any law to frustrate the lawful trial by a competent court. In such a case the legal maxim nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria applies. The persons violating the law cannot be permitted to urge that their offence cannot be subjected to inquiry, trial or investigation. (Vide Union of India v. Major General Madan Lal Yadav [(1996) 4 SCC 127 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 592 : AIR 1996 SC 1340] and Lily Thomas v. Union of India [(2000) 6 SCC 224 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1056] .) Nor can a person claim any right arising out of his own wrongdoing (jus ex injuria non oritur).”
The appointment itself being illegal, there is no question of the terminated employee seeking fruits of his employment by way of gratuity. We uphold the decision of the PSU forfeiting his entire gratuity. However, in the case of conductors (Civil Appeal No._____________ @SLP (C) No.21957 of 2022), we see that the act alleged and proved is of misappropriation of meagre amounts. It is trite that even if minimal amounts are misappropriated it would constitute a misconduct warranting termination, as held by this Court. However, on the question of forfeiture of gratuity, we are of the opinion that the Appointing Authority should have taken a more sympathetic approach. We do not propose to send back the matter for fresh consideration but direct the Appointing Authority to limit the forfeiture to 25% of the gratuity payable and release the balance amounts to the respondent employees.
We allow the appeals with the above modification in so far as the extent of gratuity forfeited in two appeals. Parties to bear their own costs.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
……………………..……………, J. [SUDHANSHU DHULIA]
……………………..……………, J. [K. VINOD CHANDRAN]
NEW DELHI; FEBRUARY 17, 2025.
Research the source law
This record is not yet linked to a specific provision. Browse the law library, choose the affected provision and ask against the exact statutory text.
Browse source laws